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Technologies Within and Beyond Practices 
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Introduction 
The incorporation of material entities as integral elements of social practices, or as inextricably 
bundled with them, is a significant development in theories of social practice (Reckwitz, 
2002a,b; Schatzki, 2002; 2010; Shove et al., 2012). As Reckwitz (2002a) notes ‘“artefacts” or 
“things”… necessarily participate in social practices just as human beings do’. Reflecting a 
similar idea, Shove et al. (2012) describe materials as one of three broad categories of element 
that are actively integrated when a practice is enacted. Yet materiality is diverse; and additional 
material roles in the life of practices beyond their status as direct constituents of performance 
have received less attention. This chapter aims to characterise some of these more indirect 
material-practice relationships by exploring two examples of automated ‘machines’: central 
heating and fully automated factories.  
 
My intention is two-fold. Firstly, I hope to extend the conceptual tools for positioning 
technologies of different kinds within accounts of practice. In so far as practice theories focus 
on what human-bodies do, they may be limited when it comes to a wider consideration of what 
humans do collectively beyond their bodies; that is, through technological systems that carry 
out processes at varying degrees of distance, in time, space and awareness from the activity of 
people. Typically, these extended relationships are not recognised if technologies are only or 
mostly conceptualised as tool-like elements implicated in the ‘practical’ doings and sayings that 
define practices. Such interpretations become increasingly problematic as new forms of 
digitally automated and autonomous technologies come into use. A broader view is also 
required if we are to represent and analyse changing patterns of resource use, especially energy, 
which enables various forms of automation. 
 
Secondly, I argue that other ways of conceptualising technologies and their dynamic relations 
to and within practices are important in analysing social change, more generally. In principle, 
materials and technologies are highly significant for how practices develop and change over 
time, not only as ‘elements’ of practice but in other ways as well. In broad terms, technologies 
have dramatically altered the nature, range and qualities of the contemporary ‘population’ of 
practices by reducing and reconfiguring the contributions and qualities of human participation, 
how such practices are reproduced, and whether and how they persist, evolve or dissolve. The 
concept of automation, for instance, indicates the potential for machines to ‘take over’ work 
that was previously carried out by people. In other words, some technologies appear to be 
important for how practices persist and change without directly ‘participating’, as elements, 
within their performance. How can these relationships be represented? And what is their 
significance for analysing the dynamics of practices?  
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To explore these questions, I start by examining how technologies have been positioned within 
theories of practice. The idea that practices are comprised by elements and that they change as 
these elements and their inter-relationships change has been central to developing 
understandings of social change in terms of practices (Shove et al., 2012). Although valuable, I 
argue that such conceptualisation of materials and of their role in change is limited. In the 
second section, I provide an example: I consider how automated machines are powerfully 
implicated in modulating another mechanism by which practices change as ‘populations’ of 
practitioners change. In the third section, I extend the example of automated production to the 
contemporary phenomenon of ‘fully’ automated factories, and also draw on a contrasting 
example of automated central heating, to conceptualise a variety of relationships between 
automated technologies and practices that form interconnecting constellations of practices and 
materials. In the fourth section, I reflect on what might be distinctive about the dynamics of 
such machine-practice relationships.  
 
Materials as Elements of Practice and Beyond 
 
The idea that ‘”artefacts” or “things”… necessarily participate in social practices just as human 
beings do’ (Reckwitz, 2002a; 208) is largely derived from the ideas of Latour, and others 
within Science and Technology Studies, who argue that action is ‘distributed’ between people 
and objects (or ‘non-humans’) such that ‘implements… are actors, or more precisely, 
participants in the course of action waiting to be given a figuration’ (Latour, 2005: 71, original 
emphasis). In incorporating this line of thinking, Reckwitz (2002a: 221) remarks that ‘[T]he 
things handled in a social practice must be treated as necessary components for a practice to be 
“practiced”’. Yet they are not the only components, as indicated in Reckwitz’s (2002b: 249) 
much cited definition of a practice as: 
 
‘a routinized type of behaviour which consists of several elements, interconnected to one 
other: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, “things” and their use, a 
background knowledge in the form of understanding, know-how, states of emotion and 
motivational knowledge’.  
 
Drawing on this general idea, Shove, Pantzar and Watson identify three broad kinds of 
elements (material, competence and meaning), which constitute practices when actively 
integrated by practitioners (Shove and Pantzar, 2005; Watson and Shove, 2008; Pantzar and 
Shove, 2010; culminating in Shove et al., 2012). These elements define the practice as an entity 
distinct from other activities, act as a set of ‘resources’ that organise the practice, and are 
themselves constituted through instances of engagement in the practice (performances). 
Through this recursive interplay, practices come into being as links between elements are 
established through performances, evolve as new elements and/or new interlinkages are 
(per)formed, and disappear as links are broken. That is, practices change as the elements of 
which they are composed change, or as relations between these elements is reconfigured.  
 
However, when viewed as ‘things and their uses’ or as ‘things handled’ material elements are 
conceptualised as tools or implements. Indeed, the concept of the active integration of elements, 
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as performed by the practitioner, tends to focus on materials that are directly mobilised, 
attended to or manipulated in practical activities. But as Rinkinen et al. (2015: 1) remark, 
objects are encountered and engaged in multiple relations beyond ‘enactment of social 
practices’. It seems other kinds of materials and relationships figure in the lives of practices, 
too.  
 
Arguably, the category of materials, or material elements, in the plural is also problematic by its 
apparent reference to discrete and bounded physical entities, ‘encompassing objects, 
infrastructures, tools, hardware and the body itself’ (Shove et al., 2012: 23). Yet also referred to 
by Shove et al. (2012) as materiality, this category is reasonably interpreted more broadly: to 
represent the inherent materiality of doing and saying including structures in and on which this 
takes place, aspects of the environment like air and water, as well as less tangible phenomena 
such as sound and heat. As a dimension or aspect of practice, materiality involves but is not 
necessarily synonymous with, the material entities that are present or necessary.
1
 Specifically, 
the relationships and interactions between entities, such as bodies and technologies, might also 
be considered as part of the materiality of practices.  
 
Yet the conceptualisation of materiality within practices is not my departure point. Instead, I 
focus on relationships that appear to matter beyond performance, at least, of single practices. 
This is the case with automated machines that carry on forms of ‘activity’ that are distanced, in 
different ways, from the flows of human activity, and as such would normally be absent from 
an account of materiality in practice. Accordingly, the potential roles of such materials in 
giving form and shape to practices and to the mechanisms by which they change is also not 
fully captured by a discussion of ‘material elements’. 
 
In this respect, Schatzki’s (2002; 2010) framing of materiality as material arrangements that are 
linked to, but conceptually distinct from, practices is of interest. Here, practices and material 
arrangements each provide a context for the other and are accordingly bundled together, 
persisting over time in interlinked patterns. Whilst ‘practice-arrangement nexuses’ (Schatzki, 
2010: 130) or ‘bundles’ (Schatzki, 2012) are not dissimilar from Shove et al.’s (2012) notion of 
practices (Schatzki, in press), the concept of material arrangements is not restricted to the 
materiality of practice performances. This allows Schatzki (2012: 4) to list a number of other 
ways in which ‘practices effect, use, give meaning to, and are inseparable from arrangements 
while … arrangements channel, prefigure, facilitate, and are essential to practices’ through 
relations of causality, prefiguration, intelligibility, intentionality and constitution (Schatzki, 
2010; 2012). 
 
From this perspective, artefacts like machines have a certain default independence from 
practices, even though they are necessarily linked to them in a variety of ways. The challenge 
therefore comes not in thinking about whether the automated processing undertaken by 
machines is related to practices, but how. Specifically, are other interrelations, beyond co-
                                                     
1
 One might also argue that such artefacts or physical entities are themselves not only material, but also constituted 
through meanings, capabilities and processes. I explore a related ‘relativistic’ notion (Ihde, 1990) that artefacts 
can only be defined in relations, rather than as things in themselves later in the chapter. 
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constitution, salient in positioning and understanding such machines in practice theoretical 
accounts, especially those concerned with processes of change and stability? And how are these 
relations performed through bodily interactions? This is implied since, to Schatzki, as to Shove 
and colleagues, the actions involved in practices are ‘bodily doings and sayings… that people 
directly perform’ (Schatzki, 2002: 72).  
 
It is worth noting before proceeding, that for purposes of clarity, and despite my comments 
above, I continue to refer to machines as examples of ‘materials’ following the established 
understanding of this category as one of physical entities, including artefacts. More specifically, 
I understand machines to be examples of technologies, again understood as artefacts (Mitcham, 
1994) and, in particular, ones that in any given historical period ‘materialise’ relatively new 
adaptations in design, techniques or tasks. 
 
Modulating Human Participation: When Machines ‘Take Over’ 
The account developed by Shove et al. (2012) has more to say about what is involved in the 
conduct, reproduction and dynamics of practices than is captured in the language of elements 
alone. Specifically, in addition to changes in the elements of practice, and their 
interconnections, they note that practices also change as the populations of practitioners who 
sustain them change, and as the connections between practices change (Shove et al., 2012; 
Watson, 2012). Some connections between practices are formed as elements circulate between 
them or are competed for; but not all connections are of this kind.  
 
For instance, Shove et al. note that ‘the contours of any one practice – where it is reproduced, 
how consistently, how long, and on what scale – depend on changing populations of more and 
less faithful carriers or practitioners’ (2012: 63, emphasis in original). In other words, who 
undertakes a practice, and how, has implications for how that practice changes from within, 
through the creation and circulation of variety (thus the configurations of elements). In 
addition, if practices can be seen to colonise ‘peoples’ time and energy’ (Shove et al., 2012: 65) 
these are important ‘resources’ by which practices connect to each other, for example, through 
forms of competition and collaboration. In simple terms, time spent ‘energising’ one practice 
cannot be spent on others, with the exception of multi-tasking and blending of multiple 
practices (Shove et al., 2012).  
 
It is therefore important to reflect on the ways in which forms of participation are modulated 
and mediated through material relations, and therefore how they might figure as a source (and 
also an outcome) of change. For example, Shove, Watson, Hand and Ingram (2007) describe 
how the re-design of materials as inert as radiator fittings or varnish enables people with less-
specialist skills and experience to use an apply these products. This is important for who can 
get involved in home improvement and hence how DIY and professional practices are 
reproduced. Equally, ready meals and pizzas are forms of technology that modulate and in a 
sense delegate the competencies involved in making dinner, and thus influence who cooks at 
home, and what it means to do so. Moreover, with the development of digital technologies, 
there is increasing debate, and also concern, about the re-distribution of knowledge and service 
work to programmable machines in post-industrial economies (e.g. Ford, 2015).  
 
 5 
Indeed, there is no shortage of narratives that explain or foretell dramatic social changes as a 
result of new or different technologies. Machines, as contrasted against tools, have been the 
focus of much of this debate (e.g. Hegel, Marx, as discussed by Heilbroner, 1967; Mumford, 
1934; Illich, 1973; Schumacher, 1989). The following account is provided by Leder in an 
endnote to his book ‘The Absent Body’ (1990: 179-181), drawing on Tondl’s (1974) categories 
of technology. It is characteristic of a widespread understanding of the significance of 
machines, but is also notable for its focus on the body.  
 
Tondl (1974) outlined three broadly chronological stages of technological development in 
which the ‘body-implement relationship’ differs (Leder, 1990: 179). The first phase is an era of 
‘tools proper’ that are wielded and powered by the body. Through skilled use, such tools 
become habitually incorporated into experience in an ‘embodiment’ relation, defined by a 
diminishing awareness of the tool itself, as a focal object. Tondl’s second phase of technology 
is characterised by machines, which are devices powered by non-human energy sources, 
originally ‘natural’ ones such as water and animal power and later mechanical power. People 
are still involved in working with machines, but in a very different way: they guide and control 
machines but do not provide the motive force. This places the body into a mode of ‘background 
disappearance’ (Leder, 1990: 180), having a supporting relationship to the machines whose 
‘needs and rhythms’ provide the ‘pattern for the work’ instead of those of the human body. The 
third phase is one in which ‘automated machines’ carry out many of the control functions for 
themselves, through monitoring and regulation. Leder suggests ‘direct bodily involvement is 
even further reduced… primarily because it has been put out of play’ (1990: 180). 
 
In this account, three categories of technology are defined by their interplay with humans, and 
specifically by whether the body ‘powers’ them and/or ‘controls’ them. It echoes Mumford’s 
(1934: 10) typology of technology in which the ‘essential distinction between a machine and 
tool lies in the degree of independence in the operation from the skill and motive power of the 
operator’. As Mitcham (1994: 168) notes, this is a key shift since: ‘as the machine becomes 
increasingly independent of direct human energy input, it becomes not just a static object but 
the bearer and initiator of operations or of special physical, chemical or electrical processes’. In 
other words, whilst tools are ‘handled’, or otherwise controlled directly and thereby 
‘participate’ in the activities that comprise social practices, machines denote a degree of 
autonomy from direct bodily power/energy and intervention. As machines are developed and 
deployed, there are exchanges between human and technological ‘participation’ in work. In 
essence, Leder’s account is of the progressive ‘taking over’ or ‘delegation’ (Latour, 2005) of 
previously human roles by or to technologies resulting in the effective reformulation (or even 
dissolution) of former production practices.  
 
Before turning to consider this outcome in more detail in the next section, it is worth noting that 
such general narratives should be treated with caution; and this is no exception. Firstly, the idea 
that the transfer or ‘delegation’ of work from people to machine (or vice versa) are ever directly 
or successfully achieved must be tempered. As Latour (2005: 70) warns, the term delegation 
should not be taken to imply that people (as Homo faber) are fully in control of what 
technologies do, or that they deliberately hand over certain aspects of work and responsibility 
to them (machine or tool). Instead, and as Ruth Schwartz Cowan (1989) argues in her analysis 
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of the changing nature of female domestic work over the 20
th
 century, technologies designed to 
automate and ease (house) work, have had unintended consequences, often introducing new 
forms or standards of work of their own. Moreover, not everything that technologies do is a 
replacement or substitute for human effort. Technologies are often useful in practice because of 
the way they extend the capabilities of human bodies and the possibility for human action 
(Kline, 2003 [1985]; McGinn, 1991; Wallenborn, 2013). 
 
Secondly, the distinction between machines and tools is not an essential feature of the artefacts 
themselves; but rather an outcome of their (changing) relationships within practices. For 
instance, Idhe (1993: 34, quoted in Verbeek, 2005: 117) argues that ‘once taken into praxis one 
cannot speak of technologies “in themselves”, but as the active relational pair, human-
technology’. Since practices involving an artefact, or its ‘contexts of use’ vary, technologies 
have more than one definition; a concept Ihde (1993: 20) describes as ‘multistability’. Yet 
‘contexts of use’ also imply relations between technology and other materials, such as those 
that are stored, provide power or are powered, and other mutual transformations. Thus, in 
addition to tool and machine, Mumford (1934) distinguishes further types of technology: 
utensils (pots, baskets) and apparatus (dye vat, kiln) both of which affect chemical 
transformations, and utilities (roads), including those that are powered (railway, electricity), to 
which Mitcham (1994) adds structures (buildings).  
 
Nevertheless, it seems that through the progressive transformation of work practices, automated 
machines have powerfully modulated who participates, and how, and thereby whether certain 
practices persist or disappear. So let us return to the question of what happens to the 
relationship between machines and practices, when the machines ‘take over’. 
 
Machine Relations: Conceptualising Dark Factories and Central Heating 
In this section, I consider how to conceptualise programmable, automated machines in relation 
to practices, with the help of two examples. Firstly, I extend the example of automated 
production to the contemporary prospect of fully automated factories. Known as  ‘lights-out’ or 
‘dark’ factories, they require no routine on-site involvement from human workers, thus such 
facilities can be unlit and unheated, and offer an extreme example of how humans are ‘put out 
of play’ in work that continues by other means. Although reputed to exist in 2016 (for example, 
a Phillips factory in the Netherlands that produces electric razors, and a FANUC factory in 
Japan that builds robots for automated production lines), and although, more commonly, it is 
only certain aspects of production processes that are fully automated rather than whole sites, I 
use this as an emblematic example of situations in which practice (involving human 
participation) has ostensibly been ‘replaced’ by machines. This implies that such machines are 
no longer elements, at least not in the same practices of production, since these particular 
practices have themselves expired.   
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My second example is of another technology designed to operate independently of ongoing 
input on the part of active practitioners: central heating. The operation of central heating 
systems is not necessarily accompanied by or contingent upon the heating-directed activities of 
people; nor is central heating a necessary component of the many other possible practices that 
are, at times, performed in heated spaces. In other words, there is a sense of decoupling or 
divergence between the heating ‘work’ carried out by central heating systems and the flows of 
human activity that transpire within the same automatically heated sites. 
 
The question, then, is how are these ‘machines’,2 both of which independently carry out 
transformations on other materials (fuels, water, air, components and other ‘raw’ materials), to 
be analysed in a system of thought organised around practices defined as distinctly bodily 
doings and sayings? If these operations fall outside the scope of practice-based analyses, then a 
lot of what constitutes the social world through the progressive accumulation of ever-more 
complex and ‘intelligent machines’ (Schatzki, 2002: 179) may be lost from view. For 
understandings of consumption, particularly of energy as used to power all sorts of social-
material processes and practices, along with the many other resources that are transformed as a 
result, this would be deeply problematic.  
 
Below, I consider several ways in which such technologies may be figured in relation to 
practices. Firstly, they can be positioned as part of interconnected agglomerations of practices, 
in which, secondly, people and technologies are mutually ‘engaged’ in various ways and which 
are, thirdly, organised by reference to cross-cutting end-oriented processes. 
 
Extending Practices: Systems and Constellations 
If bodily doings and sayings in dark factory production and central heating are reduced, and 
routinely removed, do (former) production and heating practices dissolve and disappear? Or are 
they still carried on by the machines? There is a distinction to be drawn here: it is fully 
consistent with Shove et al.’s (2012) framework, and with Schatzki’s theory of practices (2002; 
2010), to claim that the processing machines undertake is not in itself a practice, if there is no 
bodily activity that is a part of this process. This suggests that, indeed, some production 
practices may disappear as production tasks are automated. But this is not to say that such 
automated processing is not still part of a practice or sets of practices or, in Schatzki’s 
approach, adjoined or bundled to them.  
 
The concept of practices might be ‘extended’ to include the operation of machines that share or 
take over the same tasks as human practitioners but which occur at some temporal or spatial 
distance from a range of human-enacted activities. For instance, Schatzki (2010: 137) refers ‘to 
the practice of warming houses’. This is a collective and dispersed definition of practice in 
which no single performance or practitioner carries out the practice of heating houses at any 
one time. Rather it is achieved across the distributed activities of builders, engineers, planners, 
plumbers, safety regulators, window and insulation fitters, energy companies as well as the 
                                                     
2
 The boundaries of these ‘machines’ as artefacts is not straightforward, yet if defined as complex collections of 
artefacts of different kinds that share certain tasks or roles, reference to central heating systems and factories as 
single machines makes more sense. 
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efforts of inhabitants to understand and configure systems, as they ‘set things up’ (Schatzki, 
2010: 129).  
 
From this point of view, there might not be much difference between thinking about automated 
machines as part of a wider set of practices, as opposed to being part of a single (but broader) 
practice. However, the former is preferable if we choose to work with a ‘tighter’ definition of 
practices, and if we reserve this term to describe activities that are meaningful and identifiable 
to their practitioners. This strategy gives us more opportunity to think through what these less-
than-direct relationships between practices and technologies mean for analysing change. 
 
To conceptualise larger sets of practices, and the forms of interconnection that characterise 
them, a number of concepts have been suggested. For instance, Shove et al. (2012) differentiate 
between bundles and complexes of practices, depending upon how interdependent and 
necessary are the interconnections between them. Kemmis et al. (2012) formulate inter-practice 
relationships in terms of ecologies of practices, whilst Watson (2012) refers to a ‘systems of 
practice’ approach. In contrast, Schatzki (2002; 2010; 2015) provides a multiply interconnected 
account in which practices are linked to other practices, arrangements to other arrangements, 
and practices to arrangements, the latter forming bundles. Bundles connect to other bundles 
forming constellations, which together form a plenum, ‘an immense maze of interconnected 
practices and arrangements’ (Schatkzi, 2015: 16).  
 
Positioned as elements that circulate and play roles in multiples practices, materials (just as 
with other elements) are important in conceptualising how practices relate to one another. For 
instance, they might be shared or competed for. In addition, the products of one practice often 
serve as inputs to others, forming the basis for sequences and other temporal connections 
(Shove et al., 2012; Nicolini, 2012). In such ways, ‘material systems’ like infrastructures co-
ordinate and configure connections between practices in ‘a trellis-like framework through and 
around which the combining and loosening of practice complexes occurs’ (Shove et al. 2015: 
10; see also Shove, 2016). In fact, reconfigurations in the ways that practices connect, bundle 
together or compete, is one of the key mechanisms identified by Shove et al. (2012) through 
which social change occurs. Conceptualising materials as elements helps to recognise and 
follow these dynamics. So can automated machines be positioned as elements within systems of 
practice? Or might such materials also play other roles in these systems?  
 
In the case of dark factories, just as with central heating, we can identify a range of related 
practices in which the factories, their component machines, and the inputs and outputs of their 
processing (raw components and products) might represent elements: in the activities of 
managers, engineers, mechanics, designers, marketeers, delivery drivers and so on. So whilst 
the practice of directly operating the production machines on a day-to-day basis may have 
disappeared, there is a whole system of other practices that remain firmly interconnected with 
the now fully automated machines. Below, I consider how these connections might be analysed 
by reference to an extended notion of the production process.  
 
At the same time, it seems that the dark factory and its machines do not feature in associated 
practices in the same ways; in some, such as management practices, the machines might not 
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have any direct or immediate material role in enacting such practices. Similarly, in the case of 
central heating, despite the range of practices that enable the operation of such machines, their 
primary significance resides their ongoing detachment from practice. Thus, to situate automated 
machines as elements of potentially multiple practices is only a partial answer to the question of 
how to conceptualise them. Questions about the nature of these relations remain, and if 
anything, are deepened by bringing into view the variety of practices to which central heating 
systems and dark factories connect. This observation is not unique to automated machines, but 
the examples are useful for exploring at least some of the variety of roles that technologies may 
play. So before returning to the question of how to conceptualise systems (or constellations) in 
which central heating and dark factories are embedded, it is important to further consider what 
roles these technologies may play in them. 
 
Human-Technology Relations 
To do so, I turn to Ihde’s (1990) phenomenological analysis of the relations between humans 
and technologies as implied in praxis or action. He outlines three major kinds of relationships: 
a) mediation, in which humans relate to the world via technologies, as tools or perceptual 
extensions of the body (embodiment relations) or through which the world is represented 
(hermeneutic relations); b) alterity relations, in which technologies are acted upon and 
interacted with; and c) background relations, in which technologies shape experience by 
remaining in the background. In fact, Ihde uses the very example of central heating to illustrate 
the latter:  
 
‘…there is some necessity for an instant deistic intrusion to program or set the machinery 
into motion or to its task. I set the thermostat; then if the machinery is high-tech, the 
heating/cooling system will operate independently of ongoing action.’  
Ihde (1990: 108)  
 
Central heating systems imply a close interaction between bodies and the technology but one 
that is not necessarily dependent upon ongoing practices. The purpose of automated central 
heating is to promote the experience of physical, bodily comfort, but to do so automatically, 
that is, to minimise the time and timing of any attention required. Thus, ‘in operation, the 
technology does not call for focal attention’ but as an ‘absent presence, it nevertheless becomes 
part of the experienced field of the inhabitant, a piece of the immediate environment’ (1990: 
109).  
 
Ihde (1990) argues that such relations are relative to practices, and as noted earlier, artefacts 
can exist in more than one kind of relation. Thus, when the central heating system breaks down, 
or when it is programmed or installed, it is the focus of attention, it is worked upon directly and 
the technology and its processes are in full view (in a focal, alterity relation). Incidentally, when 
engaged with heating in this manner, a plumber might act on the heating system with a spanner; 
and if very skilled, the spanner withdraws from his/her attention, becoming an extension of 
his/her body in practice (an embodiment relation).  
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Dark factories are similarly figured in sets of practices that define them differentially as 
machines to be acted upon, tools to be acted with, or part of the background field of other 
practices. Yet the relationship between operator-bodies and fully automated factories is one of 
more thorough decoupling, not just backgrounding. Other practices do necessitate bodily co-
presence at the factory and direct manipulation, as in the case of engineers maintaining the 
machinery. But it might be argued that the absence of operators per se from the core process of 
production implies that such a process is itself is largely ‘bracketed off’ from practice and in so 
doing ‘black-boxed’ as if it were a single technology or artefact in its own right. Thus, although 
a dark factory is more than one machine it may be figured as a singular entity in certain human-
technology relationships.  
 
Intriguingly, relationships between dark factories, and practices like management, design or 
marketing, become rapidly complex: they are multiply mediated by other technologies, and 
practices, and may be thought to exist between groups of people (organisations or ‘corporate 
bodies’) rather than single human beings. In addition, some of these relationships with 
materials are not themselves necessarily material: or rather, in this case, they don’t involve the 
material substance of the factory directly. In Schatzki’s (2012: 4) terms ‘thoughts and 
imaginings’ about dark factories must be an aspect of design and management practices, and 
they (intentionally) link together these practices and material arrangements. But do thoughts 
and imaginings qualify as material elements of the performance of these practices?  
 
Whilst this is an intriguing question, I wish simply to note some of these additional ‘modes’ in 
which technologies might be ‘engaged’ in practices: as acted on practically or in thought, as 
acted with or through, and as acting in the background. I also wish to underline the point that 
these are relational roles that for any one technology may be more or less apparent from 
moment to moment, within and across the different practices that ‘surround’ them. 
 
Extended Processes: Patterns of Temporal Relations and Material Flows 
In thinking about the systems of practice in which central heating and dark factories are 
situated, a discussion of the extended range of potential human-technology relationships 
suggests that such systems are materially inter-connected through more than the circulation of 
the material elements of performance. Following Schatzki, I will refer to these agglomerations 
as constellations, that is, as interconnected nets of materials and practices. In taking this 
approach I still consider practices to be constituted through elements of materiality; yet I wish 
to also show how materials are inter-connected to one another in flows and complex 
interactions which may be decoupled from performances, the very fact of which conditions the 
sequences and other connections that form between practices. Let me elaborate.  
 
Even apparently passive objects do things when they are not being actively mobilised in 
practice at a particular time. For instance, roofs are useful precisely because, once set up, they 
do not need to be attended to in order to keep out the rain. Such ‘passive’ material interactions 
include storing, channelling or providing surfaces, and may apply to clothes, teacups, buildings, 
and so on. The fact that things tend to remain ‘set up’ in absence of human interaction is also 
significant: that furniture, equipment, roads and so on remain where they are put thereby holds 
space open in which practices can readily take place, at another time. Practices are therefore 
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connected to such material arrangements and interactions temporally, that is, in various 
intermittent sequences that might involve setting up, monitoring, maintaining, and putting 
away.  
 
The same is true of relationships between materials that involve active, energy-demanding 
processes such as the sculpting, welding and mixing that might take place in dark factories, and 
the burning and pumping that central heating systems perform. In this regard, heating systems 
are much like automated production factories in that ‘they carry on, overtaking the formal roles 
that, at one time or another, have been assigned to them’ (Rinkinen et al, 2015: 12). For 
example, as Rinkinen et al. (2015) explain, there are significant differences in ways that small-
scale wood-fired heating processes organise human inputs compared to those associated with 
automated central heating systems (Jalas and Rinkinen, 2013). Both require attention but in 
very different ways, and both follow and reproduce quite distinctive rhythms. In other words, 
there needs to be a way of accounting for the temporal ordering associated with automated 
heating or production systems that extend beyond the machines involved and that include 
various forms of remote or indirect involvement in multiple practices.  
 
In some ways, this is a question of how practices and material arrangements mutually impose 
order on each other. This is evident in Schatzki’s conceptualisation of mutual patterns of 
causation between machines and practices:  
 
Whenever humans build machines that something other than human effort powers or 
use living organisms and things for their purposes, the causal contribution to and 
significance of these entities (and arrangements thereof) for human coexistence is either 
set up by or otherwise relative to human practices (actions, ends, projects).  
Schatzki, 2002: 117-118 
 
Just as practices articulate ends, the achievement of which is likely require at least some 
temporal and material ordering; certain materials, in their dynamic relations with others, also 
impose order on the timing and duration of related practices. This might include ‘natural' 
biological processes such as thermoregulation, sleep and eating/digestion and fermentation. 
Also, according to Leder (1990) automated machines generate temporal demands in relation to 
the practices required to set-up, maintain and control them. Where such mutually shaping 
patterns emerge in relation to shared ends, it may be helpful to refer to an ‘extended process’ 
that is organised across the constellation of practices and materials, and that is itself formed by 
virtue of these inter-relations. Thus defined, extended processes are characterised by sequences 
of activity and material interactions that are temporally and teleologically ordered, referring not 
just to the operations of automated machines but to what they help achieve as part of 
constellations. Central heating and automated production (of particular products) are good 
examples.  
 
In sum, a concept of extended processes (or something similar) may be useful for thinking 
about how some constellations are organised, how they are reconfigured and even, potentially, 
reproduced on an ongoing basis. For example, if taken as a unit of analysis, we can analyse 
how production or heating processes change over time, or how they vary, with the inclusion of 
 12 
different kinds of technologies or practices, and as certain practices disappear and as others 
emerge. When analysing change, the qualities of these extended processes are important for 
understanding changes in the temporal and material relations that connect constellations, how 
such relations and constellations are stabilised, maintained and adapted, and the modes of 
engagement between humans and technology they call for.  
 
Shifting Constellations: The Distinctive Dynamics of Automated Machines?  
In positioning central heating systems and dark factories within larger sets of practices, I have 
considered a number of relations through which these automated machines relate to practices 
(and other materials), in addition to their role as direct material elements. This includes 
temporal-material patterns and intentional and background relations. In this section, I turn to 
consider some of the implications of these, now extended, relations for analysing processes of 
change, again drawing on the examples of central heating and dark factories. In this, I am 
particularly interested in what might be distinctive about how automated technologies and 
related practices co-evolve.  
 
I briefly consider five speculative ideas: a) that these dynamics might resemble those associated 
with the elements of single practices; b) that patterns of human and machinic involvement 
change across constellations in ways that reflect processes that connect them; c) that processes 
in which automated machines are embedded might be more stable than those achieved only 
through practices; and d) that they might also be more readily standardised, e) change more 
rapidly, and f) that such constellations might become an irreversible yet background-like 
condition of society. 
 
Elements of Systems 
Just as technologies might be situated as constitutive elements of practices, they might also be 
considered as necessary aspects of the existence and continued reproduction of sets of practices. 
In arguing that socio-technical systems of mobility can be reframed as systems of practice, 
Watson (2012: 493) refers to ‘systemic elements – including infrastructures, technologies, 
rules, norms and meanings – which those practices constitute and maintain’. Thus, the idea that 
single practices change as their elements change can be extended to systems of practices. 
Importantly, this may apply in the case of elements that are not directly constitutive of, or 
shared by, all the practices within a system. For example, relationships between practices 
within a system may be reconfigured by the technological development or redesign of elements 
of one central, or highly interconnected, practice. Equally, elements may change as the system 
changes: not only in physical form as objects are redesigned to reflect the ways they are used, 
but also in the sense that meanings and functions develop as practices, and the relationships 
between them, change. In effect, this positions automated machines as interpretively flexible 
and co-evolving technologies-in-use (e.g. Hand and Shove, 2007) in relation to a system of 
practices, rather than any single practices that involve their direct physical manipulation. 
 
Elements of Constellations: Reconfiguring Temporal-Material Patterns 
In a similar way, it makes sense to think of automated machines as elements of processes that 
are organised across constellations. With the introduction of automated machines, cross-cutting 
interconnections are reconfigured in ways that matter for types of human and machinic 
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participation and for the temporal and material organisation of the whole constellation (here 
bounded by the processes of production or heating). For instance, automation might involve the 
re-allocation of person-hours from one practice to another within the constellation, for instance, 
shifting ‘work’ from tasks of machine-operation to those of programming and monitoring 
remotely sensed feedback. This may require quite different skills, with the result that 
populations of suitably qualified practitioners may also change. In addition, more extensive 
automation may have further consequences, perhaps entailing changes to delivery schedules or 
the types of materials used as inputs.  
 
Beyond the ‘immediate’ constellation – i.e. the production process itself - other adaptations 
may follow across a wider sets of practices. For example, automation may render some 
populations of previous, or would-be, practitioners redundant, thus ‘freeing up’ time for 
practices in other constellations. Economic and political changes associated with mass 
automation are at least partially associated with the re-allocation of time between different sets 
of practices. And in the case of heating, for example, time not spent collecting fuel and 
preparing fires may be used for other pursuits, perhaps resulting in less seasonally distinct 
schedules of activity. 
 
Persistence and Stability 
In principle, a largely machinic ‘extended’ process is likely to evolve differently to one that is 
largely performed by human practitioners. We might expect such a process to be more stable 
compared with situations in which practices are continually reproduced through human 
performance and are consequently subject to ongoing if minor variation. Human performances 
occur across different spaces, times and settings and this is widely understood as a means by 
which practices change from within, albeit slowly (Warde, 2005; Røpke, 2009; Shove et al., 
2012).  
 
In contrast, certain material arrangements and technologies sustain the stability and durability 
of practices over time in part because of their physical durability (Latour, 1991; Gieryn, 2002). 
Thus much like buildings, which do not have to be continually re-performed in practices, even 
if they often are re-interpreted and re-configured (Gieryn, 2002), it could be argued that fully 
automated technologies provide something of a stabilising and structuring context to the 
practices that connect to them, and within the constellations in which they are embedded. For 
instance, and at a minimum, a process that requires no human intervention presents a different 
set of challenges for managers caught up in the wider flux of economic, political and industrial 




Processes that are largely undertaken by machines can be engineered in ways that seem 
infeasible for processes that are enacted by people, no matter how ‘rationalised’, well-regulated 
or ‘mechanical’ they are. This suggests that automated systems may be amenable to higher 
degrees of standardisation. As others have observed, heating and air conditioning technologies 
are inextricably implicated in global circulations of standardised expectations and actual 
conditions within buildings (Shove, 2003; Healy, 2008). In part, it was the development of 
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machines that could automatically maintain a set point temperature that first raised the question 
of what indoor temperatures should be like. The scientific process of specifying comfort 
parameters has subsequently provided a rationale for the promulgation of air conditioning 
systems that can reliably deliver these fixed conditions, whatever the weather. 
 
Rate of Change 
In contrast to the prospect of stability, it is also plausible that a largely machinic or automated 
process is more amenable to intentional re-engineering or reconfiguration and rapid change 
than a process that largely depends on human performance. As Schatzki (2013) notes, it is not 
just technologies that lend durability to social life, but also slowly changing competences and 
understandings. From this point of view, software updates and new robotics might well outstrip 
the speed of change in bodily competence. Moreover, by reducing or removing the temporal 
and material challenges of coordinating and organising human work, such as operating 
conditions (light, heat, safety), shift patterns and working hours, it may be possible to re-
imagine and re-organise extended processes in different ways.  
 
Irreversibility and Transformation  
As indicated above, production processes, in particular, appear to be transformed through 
processes of automation. One consequence is that it becomes increasingly difficult, if not 
impossible, to ‘reverse-engineer’ these processes of production and return to forms of work 
powered only by the human body. This may not be the result of any one moment of automation, 
but rather an outcome of successive sequences of automation and transformation such as those 
which enable the range of products, infrastructures and even foodstuffs that are common today.  
 
The irreversibility of what were once apparently negotiable distinctions and delegations 
between bodily and machine-centred work is deepened as competences change: just as new 
skills, for instance, in controlling and making automated machines emerge, others are lost. 
More broadly, the economics of work adapts and shifts as ‘work’ time is reallocated and re-
evaluated, as competences change and as the ‘working’ population is re-defined. This adds to a 
sense of deepening inter-dependence between fully and partly automated production processes 
and the wider net of constellations in which they are positioned, as both co-evolve. Economic 
and social organisations predicated on advanced automated production processes emerge, as 
these processes and systems become part of the more materially durable fabric of society, much 
like buildings or roundabouts.  
 
Discussion 
It seems obvious that practices, technologies, bodies, and other material and immaterial flows 
are intimately and variously related in ways that shape and are shaped by each other. It is hardly 
contentious to claim that they co-evolve. However, it is more difficult to differentiate and 
conceptualise the kinds of relationship and modes of change involved in this co-evolution. To 
date much of the discussion about how practices emerge, transform and disappear has focused 
on objects that are manipulated and used. Thus conceptualised, technologies are seen as one of 
several interlinked elements of practices between which a number of recursive dynamics can be 
traced, including connections to other practices. As others have noted, this is not the only way 
in which material relations figure in the dynamics of practice, meaning that it is important to 
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‘unpack’ and differentiate between the distinctive roles that different materials and 
arrangements play in practices and their dynamics (Shove, this volume; Shove et al., 2015; 
Rinkinen et al., 2015).  
 
In this chapter, I have furthered this discussion by focusing on relationships between practices 
and automated machines. Such relations are marked by the relative absence and decoupling of 
human practitioners rather than being defined by forms of inter-linkage and co-participation. At 
the same time, I have shown that such machines are indeed embedded in wider sets of practice, 
and that when viewed in these terms, entire factories might be considered as technologies-in-
use at a more aggregate scale.  Even so, modes of ‘engaging’ with or relating to fully automated 
technologies differ significantly from direct interactions with tools that are handled. This 
suggests that different dynamics may operate in constituting and transforming the constellations 
in which automated machines are embedded, as compared to processes that are reproduced 
through active human participation. The implications are ambiguous: it seems that machinic 
arrangements are at once seemingly more stable and at the same time more open to intentional 
re-design than processes that are reproduced by multiple, variously skilled bodies.   
 
At a more general and equally speculative level, a distinction between tool and machine-based 
relations points to two primary modes of social reproduction: one of practices and one of 
‘extended processes’, as sets of procedures organised around a particular project or end. In 
many cases, practices and processes overlap. Where projects involve machinic and other 
material processes, the roles of things are heavily interconnected and co-ordinated with and by 
doings and sayings. However, through more sophisticated forms of control, learning and 
interconnections with other machines, some machinic operations become increasingly 
independent, only requiring setting up, adjustment and maintenance: activities which are 
typically concentrated amongst a smaller group of practitioners.  
 
The practical, political implications of such generic shifts are uncertain. However, the 
bracketing off, or decoupling, an increasing array of (ever expanding) processes from the realm 
of human-centred practice suggests that the dynamics of at least some areas of practice depend 
upon the operation of ever more complex material structures and infrastructures.  Moreover, as 
sophisticated, digital control technologies are integrated with complicated mechanical 
procedures, as in the case of fully automated factories, the boundaries of technological artefacts 
may be re-constituted. As they get ‘bigger’ such technologies cannot be ‘used’ by single bodies, 
nor can they be interacted with directly – though they are clearly worked on and ‘used’ but in a 
different more distanced sense. In addition, through their routine operation, they stand in 
something like a background-relation to larger systems of practice, simultaneously constituting 
and reconfiguring them in subtle and indirect ways.  
 
Attending to these kinds of practice-material relationships is challenging. It calls for a 
willingness to simultaneously think beyond the body, and to consider to a range of relationships 
less familiar than those of direct manipulation and perception, whilst, at the same time being 
able to account for the ways in which these less-than-direct relationships remain anchored in 
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